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Do we (still) need to regulate fixed network retail markets?
| Eingestellt von: | Daniel Schwichtenberg |
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| Eingestellt am: | 04.12.2008 |
| Dateigröße: | 121 KB |
| Dateityp: | PDF-Datei  [Viewer]
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Götz, G. (2008): Gemeinsam mit Wolfgang Briglauer und Anton Schwarz, MAGKS Discussion Paper No. 26 Abstract In the beginning of fixed network liberalisation in Europe in the late 1990s, the main concern of regulators was to lower calls prices. This was done by introducing wholesale regulation and promoting service based competition. Some years later, the concern of some regulators turned from too high calls prices to too low calls prices which might ‘squeeze’ entrants out of the market. We look at a simple model in which this development is explained by increasing competitive pressure from an ‘outside opportunity’, e.g. mobile telephony. We conclude that a margin squeeze is not necessarily used by the incumbent as a device to drive competitors out of the market and increase market power but can also result from increased inter-model competition. If this is the case, we argue that regulators should consider alternatives to cost oriented access prices such as retail minus or complete deregulation. Keywords: access regulation, vertical integration, foreclosure, price squeeze, telecommunications, fixed networks JEL: L12, L41, L42, L50, L96 |
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Professur für VWL - Industrieökonomie, Wettbewerbspolitik und Regulierung
Prof. Dr. Georg Götz
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